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Assuming that self-awareness is not a unitary phenomenon, and that one can be aware 
of different aspects of self at any one time, it follows that selective impairments in self-
awareness can occur.  This paper explores the idea that autism involves a particular 
deficit in awareness of the “psychological self”, or “theory of own mind”.  This 
hypothesised deficit renders individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) at least 
as impaired at recognising their own mental states as at recognising mental states in 
other people.  This deficit, it is argued, stands in contrast to an apparently typical 
awareness of the “physical self” amongst people with autism.  Theoretical implications 
of the empirical evidence are discussed.   
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According to the original use of the term, ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) refers to the ability to 
attribute mental states, like beliefs and intentions, to self and others in order to 
explain and predict behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  According to one, 
arguably dominant, theoretical position, the ability to recognise mental states in 
oneself depends on the same psychological mechanism, or process, or core 
knowledge, as recognising mental states in other people (e.g., Carruthers, 2009; Frith 
& Happé, 1999; Gopnik, 1993; Hobson, 1990; Leslie, 1987).  The implications of this 
theory for our understanding of autism, a disorder widely acknowledged to involve a 
diminished understanding of others’ minds, were the subject of an influential paper by 
Frith & Happé (1999; but see Hobson, 1990 for an earlier discussion of the 
developmental relation between self-awareness and ToM in autism).  In this paper, 
Frith and Happé argued that people with autism might have as little awareness of their 
own mental states as they have awareness of the mental states of other people (see 
also Frith, 2003).  This controversial claim has been questioned by several researchers, 
each of whom has argued that self-awareness (of mental states) is intact in autism, 
despite a deficit in recognising mental states in others (Goldman, 2006; Nichols & 
Stich, 2003; McGeer, 2004; Raffman, 1999).  According to these philosophers, the 
ability to recognise mental states in others is either (a) dependent upon direct first-
person access to one’s own mental states, such that those states can be used to 
simulate (or imagine) the other’s mental states (e.g., Goldman), or (b) reliant on an 
entirely separate underlying system to that employed to represent mental states in 
self (Nichols & Stich, 2003). 
A key aim of the current paper is to evaluate whether autism involves a deficit 
in theory of own mind (as well as theory of others’ minds) and to what extent an 
observed deficit in self-awareness is ‘domain-specific’.  It is widely assumed amongst 
both philosophers and psychologists, that the self is not a unitary construct, but 
consists of various aspects/dimensions each of which can be both (non-reflexively) 
experienced and (reflexively) known at any one time.  One particularly salient 
distinction is between the physical self and the psychological self (Gillihan & Farah, 
2005; Neisser, 1988).  Intuitively, experience and knowledge of one’s own body seems 
quite separable from experience and knowledge of one’s own mind.  For some 
theorists, however, these two aspects of self-awareness are intimately connected (e.g., 
Lewis, 2003), with the latter depending in large part on the former (e.g., Russell, 1996).  
How these issues help to understand autism and how research into self-awareness in 
autism helps to clarify these issues will be the focus of this paper.   
 
Awareness of the Psychological Self, or “Theory of own Mind” 
 
For typically developed humans, mindreading is a swift (frequently non-conscious) 
process.  We routinely attribute thoughts, feelings, perceptions and so forth to other 
people to make sense of their behaviour.  It is widely acknowledged that, for one 
reason or another, individuals with ASD show impairments in recognising mental states 
in other people, particularly epistemic states like belief and knowledge.   The question 
to be addressed in this part of the paper, though, is whether the difficulty in 
recognising such mental states in others, amongst people with ASD, extends to a 
similar (or maybe even more profound) difficulty in recognising mental states in self.     
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Recognising own (false) beliefs 
 
Amongst both typically and atypically developing children, the task used most 
frequently to assess awareness of mental states in others and self has been the 
“Smarties” (unexpected contents) false belief task (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986).  
In this task, participants are shown a Smarties tube and asked what they think is inside.  
Having responded that they believe there are Smarties/sweets inside, the participant is 
shown that the tube actually contains a pencil and is then asked (a) what they thought 
was inside the tube before they looked (Self test question) and (b) what another 
person, who has not seen the actual contents of the tube, would believe was inside 
(Other-person test question).  Success on tasks like this is often seen as the ‘acid-test’ 
of ToM competence because it requires an understanding of behaviour in terms of an 
individual’s mis-representation of reality, as opposed to reality itself.1   Typically 
developing children begin to pass these tasks consistently from approximately four 
years of age and show parallel performance across the Self and Other-person test 
questions of the Smarties task (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 
In those (relatively few) studies that have employed the Smarties task and 
analysed the performance of children with autism on both the Self and Other-person 
test questions, some striking results have been reported.   In keeping with the 
argument that self-awareness of mental states in intact amongst people with autism, 
two early studies found that children with this disorder found the Self test question 
significantly easier than the Other-person test question (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Perner 
et al., 1989).  In each of these studies, participants with autism were impaired at 
recognising another’s false belief, despite passing the Self test question at similar rates 
to comparison participants.   
If reliable, these results would present a significant challenge to Frith and 
Happé’s (1999) suggestion that children with autism have an impaired theory of own 
mind.  However, in both Perner et al. (1989) and Leslie and Thaiss (1992), participants 
were asked, in the Self test question, what they had previously said was in the 
Smarties tube, rather than what they had thought was inside.  It may be that 
individuals with autism, unlike typically developing children, do not automatically 
associate what a person (including themselves) says with what they believe.  In other 
words, children with autism may have been quite able to remember what they had 
said was in the Smarties tube, especially considering their statement was made only 
approximately 30 seconds prior to the Self test question being asked.  Whether they 
represented their (false) belief about the contents of the tube is a different matter.  By 
directing children with autism to their earlier statement, Perner et al., and Leslie and 
Thaiss may have inadvertently confounded their results.  Indeed, several subsequent 
studies have observed deficits on the Smarties Self test question amongst children 
with autism when the question has been phrased in terms of the participant’s previous 
thought about what was inside the box, rather than their previous statement (Baron-
Cohen, 1991, 1992; Fisher, Happé, & Dunn, 2005; Russell & Hill, 2001; Williams & 
Happé, 2009a).   
These latter studies confirm that children with autism are impaired at 
recognising their own as well as others’ false beliefs, supporting Frith and Happé’s 
(1999) contention that self-awareness of mental states is diminished in autism.  
However, even these latter studies may over-estimate the extent to which children 
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with autism can represent their own false beliefs, given that in each study participants 
with autism were asked to explicitly state their (false) belief prior to being asked the 
Self test question.  Williams & Happé (2009a) removed this potential confound by 
pretending to have cut a finger and asking participants to fetch them a plaster (band-
aid).  Participants were confronted by three different boxes, only one of which was a 
plasters box (which actually contained birthday cake candles).  By choosing to open the 
plasters box (thereby discovering the candles), rather than either of the other 
containers, participants clearly demonstrated their (false) belief that the plasters box 
contained plasters.  Having not verbalised this belief, however, success on the 
subsequent Self test question could not reflect any kind of compensatory ‘memory for 
statement’ strategy, but rather self-awareness of their false belief.  Results from this 
experiment were that children with autism were unique as a group in finding the Self 
test question from this task significantly more difficult than the Other-person test 
question.  Amongst both young (3- to 5-year-old) typically developing and learning 
disabled (intellectually impaired) comparison participants, performance on the Self 
test question was equivalent to performance on the Other-person test question.  At 
least with respect to false beliefs, therefore, children with autism appear at least as 
impaired, and probably more impaired, at recognising their own mental states as at 
recognising mental states in others (see below for further discussion).   
 
Recognising own intentions 
 
Prior to 2009, only two studies had specifically explored awareness of own intentions 
amongst children with autism.   In a study by Phillips, Baron-Cohen, and Rutter (1998), 
children with autism and well-matched comparison participants were engaged in a 
rigged shooting game, in which they shot at an intended target (some of which 
contained a prize) using an electronic gun.    After each turn, participants were asked 
whether or not the fallen target was the one they intended to hit.   Phillips et al. found 
that comparison participants were able to correctly report their prior intention to hit a 
particular target, regardless of whether their intention had been fulfilled and/or 
whether the fallen target yielded a prize or not.  In contrast, participants with autism 
tended to report a mis-hit as intentional when it resulted in a prize, but as 
unintentional when it did not.  This suggests that children with autism confuse desires 
and intentions.  When a mistake (hitting the wrong target) resulted in a desire (for a 
prize) being satisfied, then the action was judged as intentional.  When a mistake did 
not satisfy such a desire, however, then the action was judged as unintentional.  As 
such, Phillips et al.’s results suggest that children with autism are impaired at 
representing their own intentions. 
However, Russell and Hill (2001, Experiment 2) failed to replicate Phillips et al. 
(1998).  One potential reason for this is that different instructions were given to 
participants in each study.  In the Phillips et al. study children were asked to choose 
which target they intended to hit.  Children were then given a coloured card, 
corresponding to the colour of their chosen target, in order to “remind” them which 
target they had chosen.  In Russell and Hill’s study, the experimenter chose the target 
for the child, again providing a reminder in the form of a coloured card.  By choosing 
the target for the child, however, the pragmatics of the task may have been altered in 
relevant ways.  When participants were subsequently asked the test questions, 
involving what they had meant to hit, there may have been some confusion, given that 
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the intention to hit the designated target was as much a product of the experimenter’s 
desire as the deliberate will of the participant.    
In another experiment, Russell and Hill (2001, Experiment 3) gave participants 
with autism, as well as age- and ability-matched comparison participants, a 
“transparent intentions” task.   In this task, participants were asked to complete a 
drawing on a transparency (like those used with overhead projectors) of, for example, 
a boy with a missing ear.  Unknown to the child, a second transparency with a 
different, unfinished drawing (e.g., of a cup with a missing handle) was laid in precise 
alignment on top of the first transparency (with the drawing of the boy), which they 
intended to complete.  Therefore, the child ended up unintentionally finishing off the 
top drawing (i.e., drawing a handle on a cup) rather than the bottom drawing.  When 
their mistake was revealed, children were asked both what they had meant to draw 
and what they had thought they were drawing during their action.  Russell et al. also 
included an Other-person condition in which children observed a glove puppet 
performing the same actions and making the same errors.   
Results from Russell and Hill (2001, Experiment 3) indicated that, in all but one 
condition, children with autism performed as well as comparison participants on the 
transparent intentions task.  This led Russell and Hill to conclude that, overall, children 
with autism were not significantly impaired at recognising their own intentions (or 
others’) intentions.  However, there are several potential concerns about the design of 
their experiment, which suggest that the results should be interpreted cautiously.  For 
example, Russell and Hill adopted a repeated measures design in which the Self and 
Other conditions of the task were counterbalanced across participants.  This somewhat 
counterintuitive design resulted in some children receiving the Other-person condition 
first.  When subsequently undertaking the Self condition of the task, these children 
must have approached the procedure in the knowledge that they were being tricked, 
because they had already observed the crucial experimental manipulation (that there 
were really two transparencies even though there only appeared to be one) in the 
Other-person condition.  The whole nature of the task appears to be quite different for 
children under these conditions and could well have confounded results (for a 
discussion of other potential confounds, see Williams & Happé, 2009b).  Indeed, when 
Williams and Happé (2009b, Experiment 2) eliminated these potential confounds, 
participants with autism were significantly less likely than age- and ability-matched 
comparison participants to correctly report mistaken actions (by self or others) as 
unintended.  Indeed, the poor performance of children with autism on the transparent 
intentions task was significantly associated with their comparable difficulties on a 
series of false belief tasks (although not independently of verbal intelligence).  
Finally, Williams & Happé (2009b, Experiment 1) assessed the extent to which 
children with autism represent their own intentions, using a different methodology.  
Participants with and without autism were given a ‘knee-jerk task’, in which a knee 
reflex was elicited in the participant, who was then asked if they had intended to move 
their leg.  Perner (1991) speculated that to correctly recognise one’s own reflexes as 
unintentional, one requires a (meta-representational) ToM.  In support of this, Lang 
and Perner (2002) found that the performance of young typically developing children 
on a false belief task was highly correlated with performance on the knee-jerk task, 
even after the influences of age and verbal ability were controlled.  In their study, 
Williams and Happé found that children with autism performed significantly less well 
than age- and ability-matched comparison participants on this knee-jerk task.  Relative 
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to these learning disabled comparison participants, the children with autism were 
much more likely to report incorrectly that their reflex movement had been under 
their intentional control.  Furthermore, their performance on this task was associated 
significantly with their performance on false belief tasks, independent of the effects of 
age and verbal ability.  These results support the view that individuals with autism 
have diminished awareness of their own intentions and that this diminution is directly 
related to their impairments in recognising others’ mental states. 
 
Recognising own knowledge/ignorance 
 
Although several studies have explored the extent to which children with autism 
represent others’ states of knowledge (see Lind & Bowler, in press), only two studies 
have explored awareness of own knowledge.  In a study by Perner et al. (1989), each 
participant was paired with a confederate and shown a series of boxes.  The 
experimenter informed both parties that each box contained a different object.  Then, 
for each box in turn, the experimenter allowed either the participant or the 
confederate look inside.  After one of the two parties had been shown the contents of 
the box, the participant was asked the critical test questions regarding whether a) they 
knew what was inside the box (Self test question) and b) the confederate knew what 
was inside (Other-person test question).  Of course, the correct answer to each of 
these questions depended on who had been given visual access to the contents.  If 
only the participant had seen inside, then they would know the contents, but the 
confederate would be ignorant.  Conversely, if only the confederate had seen inside, 
then they would know the contents, but the participant would be ignorant. 
Perner et al. (1989) found that participants with autism were significantly 
impaired on each of these test questions.  Unlike comparison participants who were 
quite accurate at judging their own and the confederate’s state of knowledge or 
ignorance, children with autism tended to over-estimate the knowledge of both self 
and other, answering that a person knew what was inside the box even though they 
had not had visual access to the contents.   
Unlike Perner et al. (1989), Kazak, Collis, and Lewis (1997) did not find 
significant differences between participants with and without autism on a task 
assessing understanding of the distinction between knowing and guessing.  However, 
this was mainly due to the poor performance of comparison participants, rather than 
the successful performance of the participants with autism.  Both participants with 
Down’s syndrome and typically developing 4-year-old participants performed at levels 
significantly below chance.  Such poor performance is out of keeping with their 
typically good performance on standard tests of ToM, including those assessing 
awareness of states of knowledge (e.g., Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994).  As such, it is 
debateable whether the task used by Kazak et al. was suitable for assessing this kind of 
understanding. 
 
Autobiographical accounts: a controversial indicator of theory of own mind 
 
In their discussion of self-consciousness/theory of own mind in autism, Frith and 
Happé (1999) relied heavily on the first-person accounts of high-functioning adults 
with autism.  The intelligent and eloquent autobiographies provided by these 
individuals have undoubtedly given us a unique insight into ‘what it is like’ to have 
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autism.  Frith and Happé used these reports to highlight what, to them, seemed to 
indicate an atypical form of inner experience amongst people with autism.   However, 
these self-reports have been used by others as evidence that self-awareness of mental 
states is intact in autism.  Nichols and Stich (2003, p.187) give three examples of 
autobiographical comments from adults with Asperger syndrome, of which two are 
reproduced below: 
 
“I didn’t talk until I was almost five, you know.  Before I started talking I noticed 
a lot of things, and now when I tell my mother she is amazed I remember 
them…” (reported in Dewey, 1991, p.204). 
 
“… One day my mother wanted me to wear a hat when we were in the car.  I 
logically thought to myself that the only way I could tell her that I did not want 
to wear the hat was to scream and throw it on the car floor” (Grandin, 1984, 
p.145).  
 
In response to these descriptions, Nichols and Stich (2003, p.187) ague that “if these 
recollections are accurate, then these individuals must have been aware of their own 
mental states even though, at the time in question, they could not reliably attribute 
beliefs to others.”  Similarly, McGeer (2004, p.239) argues that, “it seems downright 
implausible to suggest that any group of people who can write as vividly and 
consistently about their own sensory experiences could really be missing a mechanism 
that purportedly makes such experiences available to them as experiencing subjects.” 
 So, do the autobiographies of really show that individuals with autism have a 
good grasp of their own mental states?  Well, there are several issues to be borne in 
mind when considering this issue.  Firstly, the impairment in reading others’ minds 
amongst individuals with autism is not taken by any researcher in the field as being an 
all-or-nothing deficit.  Certainly, these autobiographers have some understanding of 
the minds of other people, even if this understanding is diminished relative to their 
typical peers, and/or if this understanding has been acquired through an atypical 
developmental process and is based on compensatory mechanisms (e.g., Hermelin & 
O’Connor, 1985).  Therefore, the fact that high-functioning adults with autism can 
report on their own mental states at all is not a challenge for the theorist who 
maintains that recognising one’s own mental states relies on the same 
mechanism/process as reading others’ minds.   
 The second and more controversial issue concerns the fact that self-reports 
offered by individuals with autism only challenge the notion that this disorder involves 
a diminished theory of own mind if those reports are accurate (Happé, 1991).  When 
considering self-reported memories, it is essential to distinguish between those 
memories which are episodically remembered and those which are semantically 
known.  Episodic memory is associated with consciously remembering personally-
experienced events, whereas semantic memory is concerned with factual information.   
Caution must be exercised when attributing to people with autism memory processes 
of the episodic kind.  I may know that a particular event has happened to me in the 
past, and hence report details of the event quite accurately, without actually 
remembering the event.  Only this latter kind of ‘remembering’ is thought to involve 
the kind of self-awareness, or ‘autonoetic’ (self-knowing) consciousness, at issue here 
(e.g., Perner, 2000).   
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In fact, there is substantial evidence to indicate a selective diminution in 
episodic remembering and increased reliance on semantic knowing amongst 
individuals with autism, including high-functioning adults (e.g., Bowler, Gardiner, & 
Gaigg, 2007; Lind & Bowler, in press).  Perhaps this selective difficulty explains a 
remarkable finding from a study of self-understanding amongst children and 
adolescents with autism, by Lee and Hobson (1998).  Lee and Hobson found that a 
substantial proportion of the participants with autism, but no comparison child, 
spontaneously described ‘recollections’ of their own birth.  Importantly, Hobson 
(personal communication) reports that these recollections were as vivid and 
descriptive as their other personal recollections.  The phenomenon of childhood 
amnesia, which concerns the fact that the vast majority of typical adults do not recall 
events which happened prior their fourth birthday, suggests that any memory of one’s 
birth (or of early life, per se) is most likely the result of confabulation. 
On the other hand, Lyons and Fitzgerald (2005) argue that early 
autobiographical episodic memories reported by some people with autism are 
accurate and should be considered a savant talent.  They suggest that a strong bias 
toward local perceptual/cognitive processing, as predicted by weak central coherence 
theory (Happé & Frith, 2006), and associated neural under-connectivity (Just et al., 
2004), could support precociously early memory development.  There are several 
reasons to be suspicious of Lyon and Fitzgerald’s suggestion, however.   Schacter and 
Tulving (1994, p.28, emphasis added) provide a classic definition of episodic 
remembering as consisting of “multifeature representations in which numerous kinds 
of information – spatial, temporal, contextual, and so forth – are bound together with 
the individual’s awareness of personal experiences in subjective time.”  It is counter-
intuitive to suggest that weak central coherence/functional under-connectivity would 
enhance one’s ability to bind together such features into a coherent representation.  
Quite the opposite, a difficulty with binding together diverse elements of events could 
plausibly account for the widely acknowledged deficit in episodic memory amongst 
individuals with autism (Bowler, Gaigg, & Lind, in press) 
The point here is that, without empirical confirmation, we need to be cautious 
about self-reported memories of early mental state understanding made by individuals 
with a disorder that is known to be associated with impairments in theory of mind and 
episodic memory.  In this regard, Bruck, London, Landa, and Goodman (2007) assessed 
the ability of children with and without ASD to recall events from their lives (with 
reliability of reports being established through parental report)One important study, 
which may bear upon this issue, was conducted by Bruck, London, Landa, and 
Goodman (2007).  In this study, children with and without autism were asked to recall 
events from their life (with reliability of reports being established through parental 
report) and also details of a staged event that the children had witnessed several days 
previously.  Bruck et al. found that, for each event that participants were asked about, 
children with autism produced significantly fewer utterances that were confirmed by 
their parents, indicating reduced levels of episodic remembering.  However, in general, 
children with autism did not produce significantly more utterances that were 
“unconfirmed” by or “inconsistent” with parental report.  This led Brick et al. to 
conclude that children with autism were no more likely than children without autism 
to produce confabulated memories.   
In response to this conclusion, however, two points need to be made.  Firstly, 
even if Bruck et al.’s (2007) findings are accurate, this would not show that individuals 
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with autism can accurately recall the mental states that they experienced early in life.  
Secondly, there were, in fact, several indicators that children with autism were more 
prone to confabulation than comparison participants.  Hence, children with autism 
were significantly more likely than comparison to incorrectly report that they had 
experienced a “silly event”, such as “help[ing] a lady find a monkey in the park” (p.79).  
Indeed, 31% of participants with autism, but only 8% of comparison participants falsely 
claimed to have experienced at least one such an event.   Similarly, participants with 
autism were significantly more likely than comparison participants to falsely report 
details from the staged event that not actually occurred.   Bruck et al. interpret the 
latter finding in terms of reduced episodic memory in autism, such that participants 
with autism “could not consistently remember which events had occurred and which 
ones had not” (p.90).  Therefore, Bruck et al. seem to acknowledge the possibility that, 
in at least some circumstances, a reduction in episodic memory could result in 
increased levels of confabulation.   
The most important thing to note from all of this is that we should be cautious 
about any individual’s memories that include details of skills or capacities that the 
individual would not have possessed at the time of the original event, even if they 
possess those skills at the time of ‘remembering’/reporting.  As such, the reports by 
individuals with autism of early self-awareness of mental states should not be 
considered prima facie evidence against the idea that autism involves a diminished 
theory of own mind.   
 
Awareness of the Bodily Self 
 
Recognising one’s own body  
  
For many, the litmus test of bodily self-awareness is the mirror self recognition task 
(e.g., Amsterdam, 1972).  In the classic procedure, the experimenter surreptitiously 
places coloured, odourless pigment on the nose of the participant.  The individual is 
then shown their reflection in a mirror, and their reactions to the image are assessed.  
Touching the nose is usually used as the criteria for ascribing objective, reflexive 
awareness of one’s own body.  The reasoning here is that the individual must possess 
knowledge both of how their face typically looks and of how this differs from their 
current appearance – they must have a ‘body schema or own body representation that 
is mapped onto what is seen in the mirror’ (Rochat, 2003, p.726).  Mirror self-
recognition has been used to assess objective self-awareness (of own body) in animals 
(e.g., Gallup, 1982), and in human infants, where it is first observed between the ages 
of 15 and 24 months of age (e.g., Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). 
 According to Lewis (2003), mirror self-recognition has the same 
representational underpinnings as required for awareness of the psychological self.  
According to Lewis, mirror self-recognition demonstrates a level of self-awareness that 
“involves explicit consciousness and self-referential behaviour.  It is based on the 
mental state of me and allows for the capacity to reflect on one’s self and to reflect on 
what one knows.  This mental state is a metarepresentation.” (p.118, emphasis added)  
In support of this suggestion, Lewis points to findings by Lewis and Ramsey (2004) that 
show mirror self-recognition to be closely associated with personal pronoun use and 
pretend play amongst young typically developing children.   
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For various reasons, both personal pronoun use and pretend play have been 
taken as indicators of awareness of the psychological self.  According to Bruner (1975), 
the appropriate use of personal pronouns indicates awareness of the respective roles 
that each partner has in discourse settings.  Because pronouns, unlike proper names, 
constantly shift according to who is speaking – I am ‘me’ to me and you are ‘you’ to 
me, but I am ‘you’ to you and you are ‘me’ to you – only ‘non-egocentric’ who are 
aware of themselves in relation to others individuals can use them appropriately 
(Bates, 1980).  According to Leslie (1987), pretend play involves an awareness of one’s 
own mental state of pretending (e.g., “this banana is a telephone”) as separate 
(‘decoupled’) from one’s representation of reality (“this banana is a banana”).  Leslie 
argues that such awareness is necessary to avoid the problem of representational 
abuse, whereby children could become confused when the use of object does not 
conform to the object’s literal meaning.   
 Although it is not at all clear why recognising one’s body in a mirror should 
constitute evidence for the additional recognition of one’s mental states, Lewis’ (2003) 
theory is directly testable, particularly by exploring the case of self-awareness in 
autism.  The extensive evidence, described above, that children with autism have 
diminished awareness of their own mental states should lead to the prediction that 
they will similarly show diminished awareness of their own physical selves, as 
demonstrated by a deficit in mirror self-recognition.  To date, four studies have 
explored mirror self-recognition amongst children with autism (Dawson & McKissick, 
1984; Ferrari & Matthews, 1983; Neuman & Hill, 1978; Spiker & Ricks, 1984).  These 
studies have yielded a consistent pattern of results, with an average of 74% of children 
with autism successfully recognising their own mirror image, across the four studies.   
The difficulty with drawing absolute conclusions from these studies is that none 
included age- and mental age-matched comparison children with whom the 
recognition performance of the children with autism could be compared.  Nonetheless, 
from the available evidence it can be reasonably assumed (although not categorically 
concluded) that mirror self-recognition is present amongst children with autism who 
reach an appropriate developmental level.  Hence, those children with autism in 
Ferrari and Matthew’s study who failed the mirror self-recognition task had an average 
mental age of 22 months, which is within the developmental window when typically 
developing children fail the task (i.e., up to 24 months).  This led Ferrari and Matthews 
(p.322) to conclude that “even when autistic children fail to recognise their self-
images, this failure cannot be taken as evidence for a syndrome-specific deficit, but 
instead is a reflection of a general developmental delay”.  Supporting this conclusion, 
Dawson and McKissick found that the only two (of 15) children with autism who failed 
mirror self-recognition in their study, were also the only two children who failed to 
display stage V/VI object permanence.  From this, they argued that “when an 
impairment in self-recognition is exhibited by an autistic child, it is a function of global 
mental retardation, not a specific feature of autism.” (p.392) 
What is so striking about the results of each of these studies is how successful 
mirror self-recognition stands in direct contrast to the severe social and intellectual 
deficits observed in the children with autism.  The fact that severely learning disabled 
children with autism are capable of mirror self-recognition (at least from a mental age 
of 38 months, which was the average mental age of the self-recognisers in Ferrari and 
Matthew’s 1983 study) is remarkable, and out of keeping with their severe ToM 
difficulties. 
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 Two studies have also assessed children with autism on an extension of the 
mirror self-recognition paradigm.  In the typical version of the delayed video self-
recognition paradigm, the experimenter is filmed surreptitiously placing a large sticker 
on the participant’s head, during a distractor task.  The sticker remains on the 
participant’s head for a period of three minutes, after which time the participant views 
the original video recording of the sticker placement.  Reaching up to remove the 
sticker from one’s head after viewing this recording is taken to indicate the possession 
of a temporally extended self-representation.  The logic here is that only if the 
participant recognises that the individual in the recording of this earlier event is the 
same individual watching the recording in the present will they recognise that the 
sticker is on their head here and now, and hence reach up to remove it.  In typical 
development, this task is passed from around 4 years of age (Povinelli, Landau, & 
Perilloux, 1996).  However, highlighting that this task measures awareness of one’s 
temporally extended physical self and not one’s extended thinking, success on this task 
is not significantly associated with performance on traditional ToM tasks (Suddendorf, 
1999; Zelazo, Sommerville, & Nichols, 1999). 
 Lind and Bowler (2009) found that, amongst participants who displayed live 
video self-recognition (which 95% of all participants did), 93% (n = 25) of participants 
with autism and 100% (n = 30) of age- and ability-matched comparison participants 
passed the delayed video self-recognition task.  These results are also reported by 
Nielsen, Suddendorf, & Dissanayake (2006) who used the same task with high-
functioning children with autism.  It should be noted that the average mental age of 
the participants with autism in Lind and Bowler’s study was 6.18 years, which is some 
two years above the chronological age at which typically developing children pass the 
delayed self-recognition task.  Hence, like with studies of mirror self-recognition, 
absolute conclusions about whether delayed video self-recognition is impaired 
amongst children with autism are not possible to draw.  However, two important 
points need to be made, in this regard.  Firstly, Lind (personal communication) has 
confirmed that amongst the six children with autism from Lind and Bowler’s study who 
had verbal mental ages below 4.5 years (and who passed live video self-recognition), 
five passed the delayed video self-recognition task.  Hence, the vast majority of 
children with autism succeed on this task by the time they reach the developmental 
level at which typically developing children recognise their delayed video image.   
Secondly, what is particularly striking about Lind and Bowler’s findings is that 
successful performance amongst the children with autism on the delayed video task 
stood in contrast to both their poor performance on an unexpected contents false 
belief task and to their significantly reduced propensity to use personal pronouns 
(‘me’) when labelling their video image.  Therefore, contrary to Lewis’ (2003) theory 
that awareness of the physical self and awareness of the psychological self each 
depend on the same underlying representational system, these findings suggest that 
each is underpinned by its own dedicated system, only one of which is impaired in 
autism.  Individuals with autism appear to possess a coherent representation of their 
own bodies (even across time), but nonetheless fail to recognise aspects of their 
psychological selves.   
 
Recognising own agency 
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Another important aspect of physical self-awareness concerns the ability to monitor 
one’s own actions.  Russell and Hill (2001, p.317) define action monitoring as, “the 
mechanisms that ensure that agents know, without self-observation, (a) for which 
changes in perceptual input they are responsible and (b) what they are currently 
engaged in doing”.  Effective action monitoring therefore allows an individual to 
distinguish between ‘self-caused’ and ‘world-caused’ changes in experience and hence, 
in Russell’s (1996) theory, gives rise to an experience of agency.  This process is widely 
thought to involve generating a visual (‘efference’) copy of a motor intention for action 
and then monitoring this copy in relation to the sensory consequences of one’s action 
(e.g., Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995).   
Recently, Williams and Happé (2009c) explored action-monitoring amongst 
children with autism, using a task based on that used by Russell and Hill (2001) who 
found no significant differences between children with and without autism.  In this 
task, participants needed to judge which one of several coloured squares on a 
computer screen was under their intentional control (through movements of the 
mouse) and which ‘distractor’ squares were under the control of the computer.  
Hence, every time participants moved the mouse, all of the squares began moving, but 
only one of the squares moved directly in accordance with the participant’s 
movements.  All of the other squares moved randomly, being controlled directly by the 
computer.  So as to ensure that participants could not solve this task through self-
observation (i.e., by visually comparing the movements of their hand with the 
movements of the squares on the screen), their hand was located inside a box while 
they were moving the mouse.  Therefore, recognising which square the participant was 
responsible for moving required them to monitor their own efference copy and 
compare this to the visual input from the computer screen (i.e., to detect their own 
agency).    
This aspect of the task was similar to the task employed by Russell and Hill 
(2001), except that Williams and Happé’s (2009c) version was much more incremental 
in terms of difficulty (i.e., the number of distractor squares and the degree to which 
the target square could move relative to the distractor squares), so as to avoid both 
floor and ceiling levels of performance.  In Russell and Hill’s study, the majority of 
participants performed at either floor or ceiling levels, leaving such little variation in 
performance that a difference between the groups in action-monitoring ability would 
have been difficult to detect even if it existed.   
There was another way in which the study design employed by Williams and 
Happé (2009c) critically differed from the design implemented by Russell and Hill 
(2001): In Williams and Happe’s study, participants also completed an Other-person 
condition in which their hand was located on a mouse, as in the Self condition, but this 
time the experimenter (having placed his hand in the other end of the box) actually 
moved the mouse.  In this condition, there is no efference copy of a motor intention 
for action and so, for an individual with an intact sense of their own agency, this 
condition should be significantly more challenging than the Self condition.   
In keeping with the idea that individuals with autism have a typical awareness 
of their own physical selves, Williams and Happé (2009c) found children with autism 
performed almost identically to age- and ability-matched comparison participants in 
terms of levels and patterns of performance.  Participants showed neither floor nor 
ceiling effects on the task and found the Other-person condition significantly more 
difficult than the Self condition.  Unpublished data from Williams and Happé’s study 
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also confirms that the participants with autism showed impaired ToM.  Relative to 
comparison participants, significantly more participants with autism failed a composite 
measure of false belief understanding (comprising two false belief tasks), ²(1, N = 32) 
= 4.57, p = .03,  = .38.  Interestingly, participants in whom ToM was impaired 
performed somewhat better (though non-significantly) on the Self condition of the 
experimental task than participants who passed the ToM tasks.  Whereas ToM passers 
succeeded on an average of 10.96 (SD = 7.79) trials in the Self condition, ToM failers 
managed an average of 14.00 (SD = 10.66) successful trials.  Although this difference 
did not approach statistical significance, it highlights that difficulties with ToM do not 
have a negative impact on one’s ability to monitor one’s own actions/agency (see also 
David et al., 2008). 
The results are also in keeping with those from an early study by Frith and 
Hermelin (1969; but see Hermelin & O’Connor, 1975) who found that children with 
autism tended to make better use of motor feedback (i.e., monitoring an efference 
copy), and rely less on visual feedback, than TD or learning disabled comparison 
participants.  In Frith and Hermelin’s study, participants with and without autism were 
equally fast at moving a stylus along the grooves of a curved ‘track’ which had been cut 
into Perspex.  However, when visual access to the track was prevented in a second 
condition, participants with autism completed the task significantly faster than 
comparison participants.  From this finding, Frith and Hermelin (p.162) concluded that 
the strategies used by participants with autism ‘were those based on immediate 
feedback from kinaesthetic or motor cues’, consistent with enhanced, rather than 
diminished, action-monitoring abilities.   
 
Theoretical Issues and Implications 
 
The above evidence lends substantial support to the idea that whilst individuals with 
autism have difficulty in reflecting on their own psychological selves, their awareness 
(both objective/reflexive and subjective/non-reflexive) of their physical selves remains 
remarkably unimpaired.  A number of important theoretical considerations follow 
from such a suggestion and from the findings on which it is based. 
  
 The relation between physical and psychological self-awareness  
 
Overall, the pattern of findings described above provides strong support for a 
taxonomy of self-awareness that clearly distinguishes between physical and 
psychological aspects of self (e.g., Gillihan & Farah, 2005).  Developmentally speaking, 
the case of autism seems also to demonstrate that one can have a diminished 
awareness of the psychological self without any obvious implications for awareness of 
the physical self.  Therefore, contrary to the view expressed by Lewis and Ramsey 
(2004), for example, reflexive awareness of the physical self does not depend on the 
kind of meta-representation required for reflexive awareness of one’s own mind.  Vice 
versa, awareness of the physical self is not sufficient for the development of awareness 
of the psychological self, although such awareness may be necessary (cf. Russell, 
1996).  In an important sense, therefore, the development of these aspects of self-
awareness appears domain-specific.     
  
 The relation between theory of own mind and theory of others’ mind 
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Another important implication from the above findings is that becoming aware of 
one’s own psychological states (at least, one’s own propositional attitudes) appears to 
depend on the same underlying functional system/process as that employed when one 
is aware of others’ psychological states.  This is contrary to a prominent alternative 
approach to characterising self-other awareness in autism, which states that first-
person access to mental states is intact, but that the process of adopting one’s mental 
states in a simulation of another person’s mental states is impaired (e.g., Goldman, 
2006).  If this were true, people with autism should be perfectly able to report their 
own mental states, despite showing impairment in recognising others’ mental states.  
As Goldman (p.223) highlights, “no simulation theorist claims that simulation itself is 
used in first-person attribution…”  As such, it seems the best explanation of the 
particular self-awareness (and other-awareness) deficits seen amongst individuals with 
autism implicates a single theory of mind mechanism, which is responsible for 
detecting mental states in both self and others, and which is impaired amongst people 
with this disorder (cf. Carruthers, 2009).   
 One key finding by Williams and Happé (2009a) arguably provides important 
information about how this mechanism (mal-) functions in ASD.  As discussed above, 
Williams and Happé found that children with ASD were unique as a group in finding it 
significantly more difficult to detect and report their own false belief than to detect 
and report a false belief held by another person.  At least in some circumstances, then, 
self-awareness of mental states is more impaired amongst children with ASD than is 
awareness of mental states in others.  This is clearly contrary to simulationist 
explanations of self-awareness in ASD, but also appears somewhat out of keeping with 
the view that a concept of belief (underpinned by a single theory of mind mechanism) 
is acquired for self and others in parallel.   
 In attempting to reconcile this latter view with their intriguing finding, Williams 
& Happé (2009a) suggested that many individuals with ASD employ 
alternative/atypical routes to mental state understanding in order to compensate for 
an impaired theory of mind mechanism.  More specifically, a limited competence in 
recognising mental states, amongst most (or all) individuals with ASD, is supplemented 
by the application of rule-bound, cognitively acquired heuristics that are used to 
“solve” theory of mind problems (in both laboratory and real-world settings) (cf. 
Hermelin & O’Connor, 1985).  Now, the available information, to which such 
compensatory heuristics can be applied, clearly differs in the cases of self and others.  
For example, one visually perceives the actions of other people and can attribute 
mental states on the basis of these perceptions.  Yet, one rarely visually perceives 
one’s own actions (unless looking at oneself in a mirror or on a video recording).  
Conversely, one has direct access to one’s own somatosensory experiences and inner 
imagery, for example, but never has access to these in other people.    Williams and 
Happé argued that when the theory of mind mechanism is damaged (as it arguably is 
in ASD), repeated perception of regularities in others’ actions provides an opportunity 
to learn “behaviour rules” (cf. Povinelli & Vonk, 2004), and thereby attribute mental 
states to others via compensatory heuristics.  Such opportunities are less frequent in 
the case of one’s own behaviour, which one rarely visually perceives.  As a result, self-
awareness of mental states is most at risk when the theory of mind mechanism, itself, 
is damaged (see Carruthers, 2009, pp.53-54 for a similar argument).    
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 Regardless of the validity of these hypotheses, the studies described above 
provide a clear indication that self-awareness of mental states is impaired amongst 
individuals with ASD.  There may, in fact, be other aspects of self-awareness that are 
also impaired in this disorder (see Hobson, 1990; Loveland, 1993) and these may 
interact with deficits in theory of own mind in important ways.  The puzzle of self-
awareness in ASD is no doubt a highly complex one, but a puzzle that, with enough 
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1.  It should be noted that use of the false belief task to assess ToM amongst typically 
developing children has been much maligned in recent times, with critics arguing both 
that success on these tasks involves skills over and above ToM, and that false belief 
tasks assess only a fraction of ToM skills (e.g., Bloom & German, 2000).  A defence of 
the false belief task as a measure of an important aspect of ToM is beyond the scope 
of this paper (but see, for example, Bremner & Slater, 2004; Perner & Ruffman, 2005).  
The important thing to note, however, is that even the most ardent critics of the false 
belief task agree that it is an important tool for understanding ToM amongst children 
with developmental disorders (particularly autism), and that it can be used reliably in 
studies assessing “the factors that improve or diminish performance on the task” 
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